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THINK PIECES 
A composite case 
Thinking with ‘BME’ categories in UK mental health care 
Natassia F. Brenman 
Abstract  
In this think piece, I discuss a composite category – Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) – that 
has emerged and expanded to incorporate race, ethnicity, and now also immigration status, 
in a somewhat clumsy meeting of political narratives and sanitised public health-speak. I look 
at how this category has been interrogated and put to work in a particular UK mental health 
setting, one that is committed to improving access and inclusion for ethnic and cultural 
minorities. Using the analytical tool of ‘thinking with’, I explore how the category was used 
in relation to an absent majority or mainstream, and consider what such a category might 
show ‘us’ in all its glaring imperfection. I ask: Is it possible to push forward anthropological 
thinking by paying attention to these composite, unwieldy categories? Might this be one way 
to embrace the clumsy conspicuousness of our proverbial elephant in the room? 
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Figure 1. Noah Purifoy’s The Kirby Express, 1994–96. Outdoor Desert Art Museum of Assemblage Sculpture, 
Joshua Tree. Image courtesy of Noah Purifoy Foundation © 2019. 
 
I’m sitting in a small circle of inwards-facing chairs in a psychotherapy centre in London. 
We’re in a therapy room, but this evening, the space is not being used for clinical work, 
which has all finished for the day. The therapists – after-hours, under cool panel lighting – 
are talking politics. Someone in the circle is holding her arm out and showing her pale olive 
skin: ‘It’s not this that makes me different’, she says, in a heavy Iranian accent, ‘it’s the way I 
speak’. Another therapist, who has been here since the centre was founded, tells us that, in 
the beginning, most of the staff members identified as black: ‘political Blackness’, it was 
called. As they go on to discuss different signifiers of sameness and difference that are used 
to describe both clients and staff here at the centre, I think of the official acronym that is 
used in the contracts and policy documents to describe whom this service is for: ‘BME’ for 
Medicine Anthropology Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
293 
Black and Minority Ethnic, which was expanded to ‘BAME’, adding an ‘A’ for Asian, and 
then further expanded by adding ‘R’ for refugee, resulting in ‘BAMER’. These official 
acronyms are not the subject of today’s discussion; I’d be more likely to find them in policy 
documents about representation or inclusion in public services. And yet, the ever-expanding 
string of letters tells an important story of the somewhat clumsy meeting of the politicised 
narratives I am hearing here and the more sanitised public health-speak that is concerned 
with ‘access’ and ‘pathways to care’. It is this meeting point, at the intersection of politics, 
public health, and the psy-disciplines,1 that I am interested in: how this composite category 
of ethnic and cultural identity relates to eligibility criteria and notions of mental health need.  
In this think piece, I draw on the sense of accumulation, composition, and extension 
through time that is evoked by Noah Purifoy’s assemblage sculpture, pictured above. An 
artist who has charted African American history through its physical debris and other found 
objects, Purifoy has also used his body of work as a tool for social change. In working with a 
different kind of historical debris, I want to ‘stay with the trouble’ of the imperfect and 
unwieldy category of BME and its various extensions (Haraway 2016). I seek to expose the 
BME/BAME/BAMER category’s increasingly untechnical mix-and-matching of ethnicity, 
race, and migration status, at best an odd by-product of pragmatism and at worst a harmful 
yoking together of ethnic and cultural differences. Yet, I do not only want to trouble or be 
troubled by the category (as we often take Donna Haraway’s famous maxim to mean), but 
rather, to make a ‘critical and joyful fuss’ of the matter as I encountered it in the field 
(Haraway 2016, 31).  
In the reflexive spirit of this series, I delve into my own uncomfortable sense making of this 
composite category, in light of received knowledge and expectations from the disciplines of 
transcultural psychiatry and anthropology itself. I propose that the way it was put to work in 
this fieldwork setting was productive, and worth us (as anthropologists) attending to, instead 
of jumping to the conclusion that the category is ethically (as well as technically) ‘bad’. I ask: 
is it possible to push forward anthropological thinking by paying attention to these 
composite, unruly categories? Building on what we have learned from science studies 
scholars in the 1990s, what happens when we look beyond singular categories that tend to 
harden, become naturalised, and disappear from sight (Bowker and Star 1999)? Might this be 
one way to embrace the clumsy conspicuousness of this proverbial elephant in the room? 
 
1  In my title, I have played with the term ‘composite case’: a device often used by psychotherapists 
(and sometimes anthropologists) to protect the anonymity of clients by merging the identifying 
details of individuals. The intention is that the case ceases to refer to any single person and becomes a 
composite of many. 
A composite case 
 
 
 
 
 
294 
In order to respond to these questions, I use the analytical tool of ‘thinking with’ the 
category as I encountered it in my fieldwork and the academic literature (Harding 1996; Puig 
de La Bellacasa 2017). ‘Thinking with’ a category does not imply its straightforward support 
or rejection but rather close attention to what it does for those invested in its definition or 
use. Three aspects of this tool are useful for me as I move through my account of how the 
BME category came into being and expanded as it was put to use. Firstly, it is a ‘relational 
way of thinking’ (Puig de La Bellacasa 2017, 72): here it attends to the way this composite 
category is made up of common ground between several ethnocultural categories, in relation 
to an absent majority or mainstream that is imbued with whiteness. Secondly, ‘thinking with’ 
insists that it matters how categories relate and in which situations. I ask the reader to bear 
with me as I move through the sometimes-conflicting narratives of my concerns, 
observations, and speculations of how this category relates to those associated with the 
mainstream mental health system. Finally, I pick up on a reflexive thread that speaks to the 
collectivity of ‘thinking with’, responding to the guest editors’ call to attend to the ‘complex 
dynamics of obviousness and invisibilization’ invoked by our proverbial elephant. We 
anthropologists are in our element looking for ‘blind spots’: what ‘they’ may have ignored or 
invisiblised. But in this piece, I count myself as one of many knowledge-makers who might 
consider what such a category might show ‘us’ in all its glaring imperfection. 
When I came into contact with the voluntary psychotherapy clinic in which the scene above 
took place, it had been providing its mental health service to diverse religious, cultural, and 
ethnic communities in London for some three decades. The service providers at the clinic 
(which I will call Culture in Mind) have always been brought together by shared ideas about 
cultural difference, and by the ethnic minority status of both clients and therapists. But the 
terms and classifications they have used (or that have been made available to them) have 
changed over the years. The early momentum to found an explicitly antiracist clinic was 
driven largely by unifying notions, spoken of in the vignette above, of political Blackness.2 
They went on to deploy the notion of a service for minority communities, using the words 
‘ethnic’ or ‘cultural’ minority almost interchangeably. The BME category and its various 
successors tell something of a potted history of how different markers of ethnic minority 
status have become important in this context: each letter marking a different political 
moment. These letters also tell us of how voluntary organisations have mobilised attention 
and resources towards different communities and concerns in health care3. In my research, I 
 
2  See Bourne (2003) for a contextualised review of how this term was employed to address common 
experiences of racial oppression.  
3  Whilst fully charting such a history is beyond the scope of this piece, details of the category’s use in 
the UK’s policy and history can be found in Craig and colleagues’ (2012) book Understanding 'Race' and 
Ethnicity: Theory, History, Policy, Practice. 
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attended primarily to the most recent addition of ‘R’ for refugee, which speaks to the current 
global ‘turn’ to migration in public health, as well as the academy (Andersson 2018). What is 
most striking for this conversation, however, is that strange ‘mix-and-matching’ of ethnicity, 
race, and immigration status in these new composite categories.  
This mix-and-match critique of the acronym stands up on its own, regardless of what 
context it is applied to (you’ll find it in UK policy and research on diversity in education, 
employment, and the arts, to name a few) but if I am to move beyond the name and stick 
with my commitment to a ‘relational way of thinking’, I need look at how it operates in situ. 
For publically accessible, free services in the United Kingdom, the way in to services is via a 
clinical assessment of need, usually based on diagnostic classifications of mental unwellness 
(depression, or generalised anxiety disorder, for example). The mainstream provision of 
talking therapy is now based overwhelmingly around cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). 
Although CBT is described as ‘transdiagnostic’ (not specific to individual disorder 
categories), the Euro-American system of classifying and measuring distress remains 
hardwired into the assessments for this treatment (Turner et al. 2015). This bias towards 
Euro-American frameworks for understanding and naming mental health needs is one 
explanation for the persistent patterns of unequal access and provision of mental health care 
for so-called BAMER communities.   
It was against this backdrop that my research looked for alternative, non-diagnostic ways of 
producing eligibility for therapy. As one of several voluntary organisations I worked with, 
the Culture in Mind clinic was constantly working to break with the diagnostic system of 
assessing mental health need. Their aim was to redress some of the white and Eurocentric 
biases in mental health access and care: being Black, Asian, Minority, Ethnic, or a Refugee 
was part of what made someone eligible for the service and legitimised alternative 
articulations of need. In the clinical intake meetings I observed, referrals made by 
mainstream professionals on the basis of diagnoses such as posttraumatic stress disorder or 
depression might be reformulated as responses to racial violence or cultural dislocation, in a 
process I called doing ‘need’ differently, in my ethnography (Brenman 2019). 
If this concern with culture and critique of all things medical sounds familiarly 
anthropological, it is for good reason: at play here is the product of what Moyer (this special 
section) describes as anthropologists’ role in ‘reordering’ categories. The Culture in Mind 
clinic has been pushing back against Eurocentric conceptualisations of mental health and 
illness since its establishment, which was galvanised by the ‘cultural critique’ of diagnosis 
from the disciplinary field of ‘transcultural psychiatry’. This subdiscipline, largely born out of 
ideas from medical anthropology, was concerned with social and cultural determinants of 
psychopathology and psychosocial treatment of disorders (Littlewood 1980; Kleinman 
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1988). As such, universalist approaches to assessing mental distress and disorder came to be 
treated with deep scepticism by academics and clinicians who align themselves with 
transcultural psychiatry and medical anthropology alike (Kirmayer 2005). In a similar vein, 
these transcultural psychiatrists exposed traditional psychodynamic psychotherapy as 
overwhelmingly white, with its accessibility often limited to the middle and upper classes 
(Lipsedge and Littlewood 2005; Kirmayer 2007).  
These forays into the recent history of thinking about culture, race, and ethnicity in the UK’s 
mental health context tell a decidedly politicised story of how the BAMER category came to 
be deployed in care settings. But there’s another story of depoliticisation that I could just as 
easily tell. It is true to say that the United Kingdom has adopted a perhaps uncharacteristic 
level of openness in the debate about problems of racial inequality in the health system 
(compared to discussion around class, for example). The result is a sometimes-baffling 
preoccupation with recording and categorising ethnicity in intake forms and assessments 
within health care in general. For better or worse, this stands in stark contrast to, say, the 
French system’s (legally imposed) colour and culture blindness (Fassin and Rechtman 2005). 
Keeping an eye on these larger scales is important if we want to understand how marginal or 
minority categories relate to wider (mental) health care structures, and how they may be in 
danger of being depoliticised and neutralised if they are subsumed into these structures. 
At this point, I return to my own position as an ethnographer, sitting in that small voluntary 
clinic, informed and slightly overwhelmed by these established bodies of knowledge. How to 
make sense of these conflicting stories of the political and the bureaucratic? My concern was 
about the use of categories altogether in these contexts, even as they enabled this cultural 
model to be funded and put into practice. But there was another, more immediate problem 
on my mind: if transcultural psychiatry had the ‘cultural critique’ of diagnostic categories 
covered, what then was the role of the visiting ethnographer? I was there, I supposed, to 
point out ‘blind spots’ and ‘unintended consequences’ of health care provision. If I am 
honest, I think I had already half decided on the ‘blind spot’ I wanted to uncover. ‘BAMER’ 
was still a category, however inclusive and eclectic its aspirations were. Moreover, the 
acronym was, and continues to be, critiqued in public debates (see, for example, the 
Guardian’s ‘Is it time to ditch the term “Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic” (BAME)?’ [2015]; 
and Jeffrey Boakye’s recent book, Black, Listed [2019]). I was suspicious of the way it was 
used by commissioners and funders of care services wanting to define their ‘client groups’. 
My worry was that this catch-all category of ethnic or cultural ‘Other’ would simply supplant 
one problematic system of categorisation with another. Was the psychiatric system of 
classifying eligibility through diagnoses being replaced with these (technically dubious) 
categories of ethnocultural difference?  
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Whilst my concerns were (and remain) valid, the point I want to move towards is not about 
which categories were present or which classification system was ‘worse’, but how they relate 
and can be put to good use. Soon after I started, one of the senior therapists suggested a 
book club be set up, to stimulate critical thinking amongst staff, particularly those who (like 
her) had been educated in countries where political discussion was discouraged or explicitly 
restricted. She suggested that in the first week we discuss the text that the organisation’s 
therapeutic model was founded on. She insisted we needed to talk about the fact that the 
client group had extended far beyond the Commonwealth communities of South Asian, 
African, and Caribbean background. These communities had been by far the most visible 
ethnic and cultural minorities when they started their work, because of Britain’s colonial 
history and the migration patterns that followed. These groups were also, then, the focus of 
critical postcolonial thinking and projects such as this one. But this had changed, and my 
interlocutors were navigating their way through London’s now ‘super-diverse’ sociocultural 
landscape (Vertovec 2007; Hall 2013). Far from disappearing from sight, the composite 
categories of BME/BAME/BAMER entered into these discussions, both explicitly and 
implicitly in how the new client group reflected or challenged the original ideas about whom 
the service was for. Where did whiteness come in? Or different experiences of blackness? 
What about the increased number of (Eastern) European people coming with their own very 
different migration experiences? Yes, this service relied upon a messy and imperfect 
category, but it was precisely this messiness that allowed them to keep such debates alive and 
to keep such inclusion criteria open to revision.  
Perhaps yet more interesting in terms of my worries about ‘pitting one set of categories 
against another’ (the replacement of diagnostic categories with ethnocultural ones) was the 
multiple ways that the category was put to work in order to disrupt the diagnostic model. In 
the clinical meetings I observed for over a year, ‘BME’, ‘BAME’, and ‘BAMER’ were used 
interchangeably and almost never treated as a fixed set of inclusion criteria. For each referral, 
the case would be made for eligibility, not solely on minority status, but in how this status 
related to clinical decisions, assessments, and interactions within the UK system of health 
and social care. In each case, how a potential client’s ‘Otherness’ (self-identified or imposed) 
interfered with mainstream understandings of mental health and illness was what mattered. 
Had they been labelled with a particular pathology because of associations with a particular 
racialised identity? Was his or her trauma being overmedicalised, due to under-recognition of 
their overall migration experience? Was there a linguistic barrier or dearth of shared 
vocabulary to adequately describe the presenting problem in a mainstream English-speaking 
clinic? Crucial to these discussions was the way such Otherness was put to work vis-à-vis 
mainstream models of mental health care. This work treated mainstream models not as 
culturally or ethnically neutral but as distinctly Eurocentric and white.  
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I have been describing a process by which, after being scooped up into one acronym for the 
purposes of administration and funding bids, the category was disaggregated in clinical 
practice. It is at this point that the ‘thinking with’ tool becomes generative. Indeed, the 
category itself becomes ‘good to think with’ (Harding 1996). By this, I mean that the 
acronym bore so many potential threads of contestation or disruption, waiting to be spelled 
out, that it easily became a conduit for productive discussion and thought. It also invited me 
to trace how the category came into being in relation to other systems of sorting and 
classifying throughout the lifetime of the clinic and its mental health context. I have 
described the different ways that BME categories were put to work by therapists, and how 
Otherness was explicitly named and negotiated in mental health care. As such, the eclectic 
mix of letters makes it an unlikely candidate for reification, or becoming a naturalised ‘thing’ 
that may disappear from view. The ontological politics (Mol 1999; Jasanoff 2012) of what 
each version of the category ‘is’, is hard to get to without considering what the category does 
and how it came into being. This doesn’t make it a ‘good’ category, per se, but it does make 
it one that is, in its essence, constantly in-the-making and subject to change. 
‘Thinking with’ categories is not to argue for or against them; it is to participate in the 
processes by which we come to know and produce certain categories. It can also be to 
contribute to conversations about how categories can be put to better use, how they can be 
‘done’ better. In this think piece, I have tried to think with a particular form of composite 
category, whose unwieldy acronym tells a potted history of various actors’ efforts to name 
and work with marginality in health care. The incorporation of race, ethnicity, and 
immigration status has resulted in an assembly of letters that (unlike more familiar and 
singular categories) is so self-conscious and unwieldy it is hard to miss: an ‘elephant in 
room’, indeed. I would argue that as health care provision becomes increasingly self-
conscious of heterogeneity within its categories, it is useful for anthropologists to keep these 
cases in view and interrogate them (as I have been doing) in situ. No doubt the discussion 
would look very different if we turned our attention to, for example, the LGBTQIA+ or 
RMNCAH4 categories, let alone the myriad ways in which they get put to work in health 
care settings. But engaging with their histories, extensions, and applications offers a way to 
think along the poor coherence and inadequacy of these terms, rather than against them. 
This entails exposing where they succeed or fail to address marginality or where components 
should be added or taken away, thinking always about how they relate to the absent 
mainstream or majority. This case reminds us that categories are always composite and 
 
4  The better-known ‘LGBT’, with its more recent additions of Q, I, A, and + stands for Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Intersex, Asexual and the ‘+’ for everything else that may not (yet) 
have a name. The lesser-known ‘RMNCAH’ is a product of the professional world of global health 
and stands for Reproductive, Maternal, Neonatal, Child, and Adolescent Health.   
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relational, and that refining, splicing, or splitting them is unlikely to make them better or 
more accurate. To think with this unwieldiness might help us to keep categories in sight, in 
motion, and incomplete. 
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